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Religious
liberty could protect unconscionable acts
by
Jetta Bernier and Marci Hamilton
This
article appeared in the Focus section of the Boston Sunday
Globe on October 3, 1999.
A warlock
in Arizona claimed that his religion required him to sexually
abuse his 13-year-old daughter. A religious polygamist in
Utah sought to add his teenage niece to his group of wives.
A faith-healing sect in Oregon withheld necessary medical
care to 78 children in its local congregation who died since
1955.
These
real and heart-wrenching stories underscore the capacity
of adult religious beliefs to override children's most basic
rights to safety, protection, and even life.
Unbelievably,
Congress is now considering legislation that would place
these children at even greater risk from religiously motivated
conduct. The Religious Liberty Protection Act (RLPA) is
a follow-up to the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA) that Congress passed in 1993 and that was struck
down as unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1997.
The
new legislation, like the old, once again seeks to prohibit
the government and any agency receiving federal funds from
interfering in a person's exercise of religion unless it
furthers a compelling government interest. Even then, the
government action would have to be deemed the least restrictive
action.
What
would this mean for children? A look at the impact of the
original law gives us ample concern. In
Vermont the state found itself powerless to enforce its
orders for child support against a father living in a communal
religion in which all income was pooled. Despite a school
weapons ban policy, a California school district was forced
to permit Sikh children to carry 7-inch functional, accessible
knives to school with them each day because of their parent's
religious beliefs. A
Christian Science mother who let her daughter die of meningitis
without medical care challenged her conviction on the grounds
that her rights under RFRA had been violated. When Justice
Stevens concurred in the Supreme Court's opinion stricking
down RFRA, he argued that the law violated the Establishment
clause because it provided "a potent, legal weapon" available
only to religious individuals. These three examples prove
all too well that he was right.
What
can we expect if the new law is passed? Parents involved
in child abuse and neglect court proceedings could raise
the charge of improper governmental interference with individual
religious exercise. Faith-based defenses could be allowed
in cases of child sexual assault involving the misconduct
of members of religious groups. Prosecutors, judges and
child protection workers would be crippled in their ability
to resolve cases quickly. Instead of focusing on the best
interests of children, they will be consumed with proving
whether their actions are the least restrictive means for
the parents. Litigation and appeals would result in significant
delays in juvenile court proceedings. Even the threat of
litigation expenses would have a chilling effect on already
fiscally strained child welfare agencies.
Court
orders for timely and appropriate medical treatment would
be more difficult since the new law could be invoked by
parents to defend their denial of medical care for religious
reasons. State foster care systems already faced with serious
foster home shortages would be forced to go beyond current
reasonable efforts and absolutely match foster children
with same-religion foster families. Children requiring removal
from their homes because of serious, religiously-motivated
abuse or medical neglect would be withheld from adoption
since it could be argued that it was not the least restrictive
action.
Child
care and residential facilities operated by religious groups
would be immune from health and safety code regulations.
Preventative health screenings in schools for hearing and
vision would be more frequently challenged by faith-healing
parents, as would childhood immunizations, raising the exposure
of all children to communicable diseases.
Reasonable
citizens everywhere clearly do support the right of individuals
to practice their religion. However, their support is balanced
with the wisdom articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in
its 1944 decision, Prince v. Massachusetts which stated:
"The right to practice religion freely does not include
the right to expose the community or the child to communicable
disease or the latter to ill-health or death… Parents may
be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does not follow
they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs
of their children before they can make that choice for themselves."
When
RFRA became law in 1993, it was passed by a unanimous voice
vote. Few people appreciated its ramifications due to its
arcane terminology and the effectiveness of its lobbyists.
Time, however, has made the negative consequences of both
the old and new legislation more apparent. Though the new
House bill did pass earlier this year, 118 House members
opposed it, including all of the Massachusetts delegation
who were concerned about its civil rights problems.
Still
there is great political capital to be gained by supporting
any bill that purports to restore greater religious freedoms.
This week Senator Orrin Hatch held hearings in the Judiciary
Committee with an eye to passing swiftly his own version
of RLPA. Not a single representative of children's interests
was invited to be present to offer testimony.
Several
groups including, Prevent Child Abuse America, the Academy
of Pediatrics, National PTA, and the America Bar Association
are proposing an amendment to the bill that would protect
the health, safety, welfare, and financial interests of
children. Like them, the Senate must place children's needs
at the center of any debate about the future of RLPA. Citizens
have no stomach for legislation that expands religious protections
for adults on the one hand while destroying protections
for children on the other.
Jetta
Bernier is executive director of the Massachusetts Citizens
for Children/Prevent Child Abuse Massachusetts. Marci Hamilton
is Distinguished Professor of Law at Emory University School
of Law.
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